The Employment Act of 1946: some history notes by G.J. Santoni
t SBOU’I’ 40 years ago, in response to the Depression
of the 1930s, Congress passed the Employment Act of
1946. Its sponsors believed that earlier failures to deal
with massive worldwide unemployment had contrib-
uted significantly to the rise of National Socialism,
which eventually culminated in World War II. This
beliefurged the act’s sponsors to find asolution to the
problem that had caused “such a great melting away
ofprosperity in such a short period of time.”’
The legislation followed on the heels of a revolution
in macroeconomic theory. ‘This new theory suggested
that periodic booms and busts could be avoided if
government pursued a policy of “compensatory
finance.” The new theory promised the success of
centrally directed economic stabilization policy and
provided the nucleus around which the proposed
legislation was built,
The bill that was initially proposed stir ed up con-
siderable controversy. Some considered it “a great
Magna Carta of government planning for full employ-
men!.’’3 Others viewed it as ‘‘utterly alien to America
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‘FullEmployment Act of 1945(1945), p. 1110.
2Hansen (1956), p. 97.
and hei’ institutions.”~Over the intervening years, dis-
cussions of the Employment Act have become less
shrill, but we continue to regard unemployment as an
important problem. The purpose of this paper is to
place this policy concern in its historical context as it
initially surfaced in congressional debates of the Full
Employment Bill of 1945 and as it re-emerged in de-
bates of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Bill of 1976.
Iit-w.icIlis 1~o1~ r .im.i
Chart I plots theunemployment rate from 1900—40.~
Before 1930, theunemployment rate moved around an
average of about 4.5 percent. Beginning that year’,
however, it rose substantially, reaching 25 percent of
3Full Employment Act of 1945 (1945), p. 1138.
4The data are from Historical Statistics ofthe United States Colonial
Times to 1970 (1975), pp. 122—23 and p. 126. Measurement, of
course, is never perfect. These unemployment data are based on
estimates ofLebergott (1957): and Romer (1986) suggests they are
relatively noisy. Furthermore, Darby (1976) argues that these data
tend to overstate unemployment after 1933 because Federal Emer-
gency Workers (employees of the Civilian Conservation Corps,
National Youth Administration, Civil Works Administration and the
Works Progress Administration) were counted as unemployed.
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Thus, because ofthe planlessnes.s of the twenties — because of the lack of
courageous action immediatelyfollowing the collapse — the nation lost 105,000,000
man-years ofproduction in the thirties.
— Full Employment Act of 1945, Hear ngs, p. 1104FEDERAL RESERVE DANK OFSI. LOUIS NOVEMBER ieee ~
the labor force by 1933, then declined fairly slowly to a
level of about 15 percent in 1940. During the 11-year
period fr’om 1930—40, it averaged about 18 percent.
Charts 2 and 3 show real gross national pr’oduct and
the price level (as measured by the implicit GNP defla-
tor) over the same period. Like chku’t 1, these charts
show a sharp economic contraction beginning in
1930. By 1933, real ON!’ had declined to about $140
billion from its level ofabout $200 billion in 1929, while
the price level fell by about 40 percent.
The sharpest recorded c,ontraction in economic ac—
tivitv that occurred before this episode followed World
War I from 1918—21), and the sponsors of the Full
Employment Bill were motivated by the fear’ that the
end of WorldWarII and the re—entryofdischarged war
veterans into the civilian labor for’ce would augur a











‘Fhe data pr’esented in char’ts 1—3 did riot exist when
the bill was debated iii 1945.~ As a result, the authors of
the bill used unofficial estimates of unemployment for
years pr’ior to 1942 to bolster their arguments iii favor
of the bill’s passagc.”’l’hese estimates were inserted
into the hearings fr’om a book by Henry Wallace that
was widely referred to ill the popular press at that
time.’
51t was not until August of 1942, when the task of estimating unem-
ployment was transferred from the Works Progress Administration
to the Census Bureau, that official definitions of “employed” and
“unemployed” were developed and consistently applied in periodic
surveys of the labor force. See Bancroft (1957), p. 66 and U.S.
Department of Labor (1982), p. 3.
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Wallace’s data, which span the per’iod 1900—44, are
reproduced in char-t 4. The chart pn’esents estimates of
the labor’ for’ce, the level of employment consisLent
with ‘‘full’’ employment, and the actual level of em-
ployment.’ The story told by Wallace’s gr’aph, which
shows a large gap between full and actual employ-
ment during the 1930s, is consistent with the more
refined data shown in chart 1
Tt1F;O.E~Vot~ ‘i:iii~. 1SF ;4,Hy.uE4F~CYCLE:
FF’ ~ ~5 “S”
L4iflt,r~ t~F~~F
‘Wallace estimates lull employment by subtracting an estimate of
frictional unemployment from the labor force. See Wallace (1945),
pp. 19—20.
‘Wallace (1945), pp. 20—22. Wallace attributed the abnormally high
level of unemployment to “the planlessness of the twenties” and
suggested that the system of free enterprise in the United States
survived only because of the “bold, courageous action of the
Roosevelt New Deal” and then only by the narrowest of margins.




influenced by the view of John Maynard Keynes.” He
suggested that unemployment was the result ofinsuf-
ficient aggregate demand n’elative to the full employ-
ment supply ofoutput.’’ Keynes argued that swings in
aggr’egate demand genen’ate business cycles with cor-
responding fluctuations in employment and uneni—
ployment.”
While Keynes suggested a number of factors that
could induce changes in aggr’egate demand, the otto
“In the minds of both the sponsors and opponents,the legislation was
considered an application ofthe theory “advanced by Lord Keynes,
Stuart Chase, Sir William Beveridge, and Mr. Henry Wallace.”
Stuart Chase was a social scientist and the author of numerous
popular books and articles concerning the Depression. Sir William
Beveridgewas best known as thechief architect of Britain’s welfare
state legislation that was enacted in the 1940s.
‘See Keynes (1964), pp. 247—49 and 260—91. “Wehave shown that
when effective demand is deficient there is under-employment of
labour in the sense that there are men unemployed who would be
willing to work at less than the existing real wage.” p. 289.
“It is upon the fact that fluctuations tend to wear themselves out
before proceeding toextremes and eventually to reverse themsel-
ves, that the theory of business cycles having a regular phase has
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he believed contributed most strongly to gener-ating
business cycles was fluctuation in business invest-
ment.” In large part, this fluctuation reflects changes
in “the state ofconfidence concerning the prospective
yield” of available investment alternatives, which can
change radically overtime due to ‘‘the extreme precar-
iousness of the basis of knovvledge on which our
estimates of prospective yield have to he made.”
Furthermon-e, activity on the London and Wall Street
stock exchanges amplified the effect of the changes in
the state of confidence on n-cal investment. Keynes
suggested that these stock exchanges transformed the
extremely important social pr-ocess of din’ecting capi—
“Some of the other factors Keynes mentions are “the physical
conditions of supply in the capital goods industries the psycho-
logical attitude to liquidity and the quantity of money Ibid., p.
248.
‘4lbid., pp. 149, 153,248,313,316 and 322. According to Keynes, this
tendency for radical change in the state of business confidence is
accentuated by such things as the “day-to-dayfluctuations in profits
(that) tend to have an altogether excessive influence on the
market”; “waves ofoptimistic and pessimistic sentiment”; the “anti-
social ... fetish of liquidity”: and “the dark forces of time and
ignorance which envelop our future.” Ibid., pp. 153—55.
tal investment to its most profitable use ‘‘into a by—
pn’oduct of Ihe activities of a casino....’’ While lhe
sponsor-s of the Full Employment Bill may not have
accepted eveny “jot and little” ofKeynes’ analysis, they
clean-lybelieved thaI labor market conditions were too
important to be left tothe vagaries of a r-oulette wheel.
?1r1 UF•flFifl}.~4)•~~)F n9:1r9.;.:;~r).’y.
(OIFIpF:i\ ~44’J’1flf9% P1I.NIMYG
‘I’he initial draft of the pi-oposed legislation went
under’ the title of the Full Employment Bill of 1945.
This bill proposed to attack the problem of unemplov—
ment in two ways. Section 2)1)) stated that ‘‘all Ameri-
cans able to work and desiring to work are entitled to
an opportunity for’ useful, remuner-ative, n-egulai-, arid
full—time employment.’’” In the view of the sponsors,
“Ibid., p. 159.
‘Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy (1945), p.
81. The proposed legislation used the words “are entitled to” rather
than the word “right” but it is clear in the following subsection and in
the debates and hearings that the sponsors intended to establish
the opportunity to full-time employment as a basic right of all
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the conditions necessar for- continuous full employ-
ment couldnot be expected from the system ofprivate
enterprise.Consequently, thebill placed the responsi-
bility for the maintenance of ftrll employment on the
federal government. Section 2(c) requir-es the feden-al
government to “provide such volume of Federal in-
vestment and expenditure as may be needed -- . to
assure continuing full employment.”
Section 3 laid out a formula for the fedelal gover-n-
ment to follow in pursuing this goal. The formula
required the President ofthe United States to submit a
national budget to Congress at the heginning of each
regular session. The budget was to contain a fom-ecast
of both the level of output necessary to gener-ate full
employment over the next yearand the level ofoutput
that was likely to m-esult if gover-nment did not inter-—
vene. If the projected level of output was less than the
“Ibid., p.81.
level necessary forfull employment, the President was
required to recommend legislation that would pro-
duce a big enough deficit in the federal government’s
budget to raise output to the full employment level. If
the relationship between the two output fom-ecasts
were reversed, the President was required to i-ecorn-
mend legislation that would result in abudget surplus
big enough to reduce output to the full employment
level.”At the time, this method ofstabilizing economic
activit was called “compensatory finance.””
1:
Oneofthe important features ofthe (in-aft legislation
was that it put in place the machinery to apply the
“Ibid., p. 82.
“Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy, Minority
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principle of compensatory finance on a continuous
basis,year in and year- out. The sponsors believedthat
a continuous application was necessary because they
interpreted Wallace’s data as indicating that high lev-




As mentioned, a striking feature of Wallace’s data is
the lan-ge and persistent gap between full employment
and actual employment that occurred during the
1930s (see chart 41. The gap averages about 18 percent
of the labor force, indicating that a very serious eco-
nomic problem existed during this period. Wallace, in
his book, and the sponsor-s of the Full Employment
Bill, during the hearings and debates, focused entirely
on this gap.
From the viewpoint ofthe bill’s sponsors, these data
indicate that the system of private enterprise was
prone to sizeable periodic disn-uptions. The congres-
sional debates and hearings ar-c filled with assertions
that “the history of employment and production in
the United States is a record of boom and bust. It is a
record of brief periods of gr-owth and development
culminating in peaks of prosperity that gave way to
disastrous collapse;” or that “private enterprise, left to
its own devices, cannot provide full employment and
cannot eliminate pemiodic mass unemployment and
economic depressions.”
To opponents of the bill, the data suggest that em-
ployment behavior during the 1930s was pervem’se by
past standards. Indeed, the ‘30s are noteworthy be-
cause the behavior- of unemployment during these
years was so unusual.”
Chart 4 shows that the level of actual employment
remained very close to the estimate of full employ—
merit over the first 30 years of the sample. ‘t’here were
sharp increases in 1908, 1914, and 1921; and the gal)
was negative during America’s involvement in World
“Full Employment Act of 1945 (1945), p. 1181. In addition, see
Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy (1945),pp.
2, 3, 9, 12, 20, 21. 45 and 47.
“Why the ‘30s were unusual is still debated and beyond the scope of
this paper. The interested reader is referred to Alchian and Allen
(1977) pp. 467—80, especially page 477, and Friedman and Sch-
wartz (1963).
War I.” These gaps, however-, quickly vanished so that
actual employment was never-much different than full
employment for any appreciable length of time.
Opponents of the bill disputed claims that the con-
ditions experienced in the 1930s were a natural conse-
quence of fm-ee enter-pnise.” While agreeing that busi-
ness cycles are inevitable, they ar-gued that economic
forcesoperate to move theeconomy in the direction of
full employment. The opponents suggested that com-
pensatory spending should be applied only in the
event ofan extn’eme contr-action to limit its depth and
duration
In addition to this dispute, the debate focused on
three specific points: U whether the r-equirement to
maintain continuous full employment and price level
stability was feasible; 2) whethen- the governnmnent
could generate the necessary forecasts; and 3)
whether the r-ight to employment should be written
into law.
t 1111,11.10; ~ F’,,-’,nin. ~•7~’”t 1111191
The opponents thought business cycles were inevi-
table, and their’ consequences, in the form of tempo-
rarily meduced employment, could not be legislated
away. They ar-gued that business cycles were symp-
torus ofthe adjustment process to, say, anmjor change
in consumer demand in favor of some goods but
against others, a change that causes pr-oduction costs
to m-ise for some goods but fall for’others, or’ a changein
aggr-egate supply like an unusually good or’ bad bar-—
vest. Any of these changes results in a movement of
resources (including labor) fr-or’n one job to another.
‘l’he adjustment takes time to complete and, in the
interim, unemployment incr-eases.
The proposed bill r-equim-ed the federal government
to i-etan-d these necessar adjustments. While the op—
pomients conceded that ‘‘Govem-nmnent spending can
for awhile create full employment as it did during the
war’’”, they objected to the policy because it m’educes
“Wallace attributes this anomaly (a negative gap) to the war years.
See Wallace (1945), p. 10, Technically, the negative gap occurs
because Wallace does not define the labor force as the sum of
employed and unemployed workers.
“Some suggested that the New Deal legislation ot this period had
discouraged private investment and contributed to the severity and
length of the Depression. Full Employment Act of 1945 (1945), p.
1137.
“Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy (1945), p.
21.
“Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy, Minority
Views (1945), p.S.FFDFR90 RESER,VE BA,.NK OF’ ST. LOU-i’S
unemployment in the short run by moving it to the
long nm and does so at the cost of higher- inflation.”
The sponsor-s of the bill conceded this point but
at-gued that the r-esulting inflation worrld lie insignili-
cant in comparison to a n’eturn to high levels ofunem-
ploymnent and the social unrest that would inevitably
follow in its wake.
.iIiipOO’SIhW F”i.n’ecasting .:Icnl,,~l1t:o?
The bill required the president toestimate the num-
ber’ of jobs necessary for- full employment, the value of
pr’oduction consistent with full employment, and the
value ofpr’oduction that would occur’ in theabsence of
anynew federal compensatory spending program. tn
the opinion of the opponents, successfully complet-
ing such a task 16 to 18 months in advance of the
events was virtually impossible. ‘they pointed out that
the estimates would depend on the prevailing price
level, the kinds of goods (and hence, jobsi making up
aggregate production, and average wage rates. They
asked Congress to consider’ “how wrong any estimate
for- 1930 would have been, if made in 1929.”
The defense mustered against this criticism was
that the bill required forecasts based on “current
trends” in thedata. Opponents pointed out that main-
tairiing continuous ftrll employment r-equired the dis-
covery of deviations from trend as well as breaks in the
trend before they occurred. Extrapolating current
trends would not do the job.
‘iJt’ fl~fl~t
0 ( ~j ,io~ 0911’
No provision of the bill received more attention
during the debates than section 2 lb—cl, which ex-
tended to all able Americans the right to an oppor-tu-
nity for full-time employment. Extending this right
meant that the federal gover-nment wotrld become
responsible for- assuring that enough jobs were avail-
NOVEMBER 19811.
able.” Opponents objected to this provision because:
lIthe bill made no pr-ovision for enfon-cing the might; 21
it would lead people to expect more than the gover-n-
mont could possibly deliver; and 3) the provision is
socialistic and alien to the basic principles of the
United States.”
During the debates, suppon1er-s conceded that, “the
statutory enunciation of the night to an oppor-tunity
for ernploymnent does not imply redress thr-ough the
courts”’ Rather, people who believed they were pre-
vented from exercising this right could petition the
government to impr-ove its econoriric polkw or obtain a
change in government through the r-egular- ejection
process Opponents argued that the inclusion of this
right in the bill, at best, extended an empty promiseto
the electorate and led them to expect more than the
government was willing or able to deliver. Al worst,
any attempt to enforce the right would be incompati-
ble with the fundamental objective ofthe bill as well as
with democratic institutions.”
SONIL’ IMP( R’IAN”.i” CHANGES
The debates resulted in significant changes be-
tween the bill as it was initially nepor1ed and the
legislation that was finally ena~tedby Congress (see
shaded insert on the next page). For example, amend-
ments succeeded in eliminating the declaration ofthe
right to an employment opportunity, the feden’al gov-
ernment’s respomisibiity to assure continuing full em-
ployment, and the requirement to submit a budget
based on the pr’inciple of compensatory finance. In
particular, section 2 ofthe final version states that it is
the intention “of the Federal Government -- -to pro-
mote maximum employment, pr’oduction, and pun’-
chasing power.” Thus, the actual legislation is a state-
“Of course, scarcity assures everyone of a job at a sufficiently low
wage. The rub came because the wage considered to be “remuner-
ative” was $2,000per year which was the averageannual income of
private nonagricultural workers at that time.
“As the Kipllnger Washington Letter once noted, “Jobs for everyone
able and willingto work leaves out a lot ofpeople.”
“Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy (1945), p.
27.
“Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy, Minority
Views (1945), pp. 4—5, 27. This criticism was discounted by Sen.
Thomas of Utah, a spokesman for the bill. He reminded detractors
“that the basic difference between the American constitutional con-
cept (and totalitarian regimes) -..is that in Americawehave all the
time the welfare of the individual person in mind.” The senator’s
argument calls to mind Daniel Webster’s observation that “There
are men in all ages who mean to govern well, but they mean to
govern. They promise to be good masters, but they mean to be
masters.”
“Ibid., p.5. “The adoption of such a policy (compensatory spending),
-..,would result in continued Federal spending over many years,
causing an inflation of prices and an artificial boom, and then the
very depression and unemploymentwe are trying to avoid.”
“Ibid., p. 3. One of the most forceful criticisms of the forecasting
requirementswas presented during the public hearings by Elisha M.
Friedman who suggested that, ‘Forecasting economic conditions
16 months ahead is a task for gods, not mortals ... Look over the
Department of Agriculture forecasts in the spring of the final crop for
the year. Look at the ... complete failure of the ICC to forecast
economic conditions or earnings. ... What Government forecasts
have ever been. . equal to the average of blind chance? How much
Government foresight is revealed in the Pearl Harbor report or in our
prewar policy?” Full Employment Act of 1945 (1945), pp. 1128—29.
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BILL OF’ “2,B7B
Thirty year’s after passage of the Employnuent Act of
1946, Sen. t’tubemt U. Humphrey and Rep. Augustus F.
ttawkins introduced the Full Employment and Bal-
anced Growth Bill of 1976. i’he core of this bill was a
carbon copy of the initially proposed Full Employ—
mnent Bill of 1945.
‘the 1976 hilt resurrected ‘‘the right of all adult
Amner’icans able, willing, and seeking won-kto oppor-tu—
muties for- useftrl paid employment at fair rates of com-
pensation.’’ It requim’ed the president to establish ‘‘an-
nual numerical goals for- employment pr-oduction,
arid purchasing power and to submit a budget con-
taining a ‘‘level and composition of Federal expendi-
tun’es, measured against estimated capabilities at full
employment and production, necessany to support
the annual economic goals proposed in section 3 and
to support the Full Emnplovmuent and Balanced
Growth Plan ...‘‘~‘ In addition to this con-c, the bill
°FuIl Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1976, pp. 7—10, and
15.
contained provisions n-egar-ding the coor’dination of
monetaryand fiscal policies, economy in goven’nmnent,
anti-inflation polic, regional employment policy,
youth employment policy ~tndincome maintenance; it
also established an Advisor-v Committee on Full Em-
ployment and Economic GrowtL.”
The legislative process was less kind to the 1976 hill
than it was to its 1945 forerunner, One critic ofthe hill
remar-ked that the seedling of the unemployment goal
had grown ml to an ‘unmanageable Christmas tn-ce,’’ ani
‘‘unwor’kahle monster’ that deserved to he chopped
down. ‘t’he hill was debated for- more than two year-s
and,like its for-el-unmet’, was stripped ofits substantive
provisions when President Carter signed it on October’
27, 1978 lsee theshaded inset’t on the next page for’ the
main provisions of the. Full Employment and Balatmced
Gn)wth Act of 1978).
comment of Raymond Moley’s regarding the proliferation of
conflicting goals in some New Deal legislation seems perlinent at
this point. Moley wrote that “to look upon these policies as the result
of a unified plan was to believe that the accumulation of stuffed
snakes, baseball pictures, school flags, old tennis shoes, geometry
books, and chemistry sets in a boy’s bedroom could have been put
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7) Requires the Federal Reserve Board to report
to the Congress twice a year on its monetary
policies and their- relationship to the goals of
the act.
pn’oposed, the legislation required the loden-al govern-
ment to intervene to smooth out the busimness cycle.
‘the legislation was based on the principle of comnipen—
Ilie legnstattve pn’oposal advanmced nn tIme Full Em—
satorv lnnmande which itguecl tom exanmple that a pno
ployment Bnll of 1945 was motivated by the severe., ‘
jected slump in dconomnc ictnvntv could he offsm t by
Depn-essnon of the 1930s and the fear- that this concir— , ..
n’unnnnmg a sufficiently large deficnt tn time feden-al
tnon would n-etun-n with the denmohnhzatnon Iollowntmg hud,tet won-Id War II. Many advocates of the legislation were
convinced that the system of prlvate emmter-pn’ise was ‘rime initial proposal did not fare well in time dehates.
pr-one to sizeable per’iodic disruptionms caused by the Var-ious people argued that business cycles reflected
erratic behavior of business inmvestmenmt As initially the process of redirecting n’esources tinmchuding labor-Ibr-ought about by nmmajor shifts in the relative denmand
on’ supply of various goods and services. In their opin-
ion, the goven-nnmment’s t’esponsihihity should be hinmited
to the nehief of destitution which fr-eqtrently could be
accomplished mnore adequately and chmeapI~in ways
other than maintaining enmployment in jobs of lesser
value.’-~ Others am-gued that tIme application of compen—
satoty finance requin-ed forecasting acctlracy that
could not possibly be achieved. They pointed out that
the business slump that beganm in 1930 was not fore-
cast in 1929 and that existing goven-nment agencies
responsible for- fon-ecasting economic conditions pro-
duced results that were indistinguishable from man-
donm chance.
‘the Employnment Act of 1946 that was approved by
Congress differ-ed man-kedly li-om the Full Employ-
ment Bill of 1945.As approved, the act recognized both
high employment and price level stability as important
econonmicobjectives~.Further-n~or-e, the tequiremnenmt to
apply the principle of compenmsatony finance, the cen-
terpiece of the 1945 proposal, was stripped away.
The Ilumphrey/1-lawkins Bill of 1976 attempted to
revive the main provisions of the 1945 bill. Congress,
however-, had become no more sympathetic in the
inteivening 30 years. As in 1946, they exti’acted the
legislation’s teeth before appr-oving it and created an
“unworkable monster” by loading the bill with an
agglomeration of conflicting policy statements. In the
end, the bill was hailed as a legislative monument to
Hubert Humphrey, who had died in Januaty 1978.
Apart from this, and the expression of congressional
senmtiment regarding a vast array of econmomnic prob-
hems, the legislation was not expected to produce
much of subsiance.
Debates over the economic consequences of the
1946 enmployment act continue to this day. Flowever,
many would agree with the assessment giverm by Alvin
Hansen in a collection ofpapers celebrating the tenth
anmniversany of the 1946 act. 1mm his opinion, public
exposure to policy debates stinmmulated by the Eco-
nmomic Report ofthe President and tIme Hean’ings befon-e
the loint Committee, bothofwhmich are nequir-ed by the
legislation, have had time effect of raising time level of
economic liten’acy in the United States. As for’ the n’eal
economic consequences of employment legislation,
lie suggests that “there are as many economic opinm-
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